Chinese devils, the global market, and the declining power of Togo’s Nana-Benzes by Sylvanus, Nina
Sylvanus, N. (2013). Chinese devils, the global market, and the declining 
power of Togo’s Nana-Benzes. 
African Studies Review, 56: 65-80 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/asr.2013.6 
University of the Western Cape Research Repository   n.sylvanus@neu.edu
Chinese devils, the global market, and the declining power of 
Togo’s Nana-Benzes 
Nina Sylvanus 
Abstract: This article examines the shifting representations of and discourses 
produced about Chinese salesmen and their collaborators in the small West 
African nation of Togo. It suggests that in this context representations of China’s 
so-called New Scramble for Africa are troublesome, namely because they tend 
to silence the role of Togolese women traders as producers and as central 
historical and economic subjects in the making of a postcolonial commodity 
chain for printed African textiles. In so doing the article questions standard 
economic theories of global market forces, debunks stereotypes regarding the 
Chinese advance in West African markets, and challenges assumptions about 
the vulnerability of African societies. 
Introduction 
In April 2004, several variations of a rumor circulated throughout Lomé’s Grand-
Marché, Togo’s main market and a former hub for the distribution of import textiles 
in West Africa: a woman trader involved in the import of Chinese-produced fabric 
imitations had been murdered at her home. While the press, which eventually 
reported on the story, suggested that the circumstances of the murder remained 
unclear, the rumor had already circulated throughout the market. The victim had 
only recently set up her own business, and she had been relatively unknown to 
Lomé’s well-established textile trading elite. According to the victim’s servants, 
who had been locked in a closet by the four assailants, the victim was tortured and 
her legs were broken before she was killed. No jewels or money was stolen. 
Because of their apparent lack of rationality, the two crucial elements of the story—
torture before the killing and the absence of any theft—gave rise to speculations. 
Since such gruesome crimes were virtually unknown locally, the murder was instantly 
associated with the victim’s trade partners: Chinese businessmen. As rumor had it, 
the victim had refused to deliver drugs she had smuggled into the country while 
importing cheap Chinese imitations of European-produced “African” fabrics from 
Shanghai. (The real European wax-print fabrics, which have been produced 
exclusively for the West African market since the late nineteenth century, hold a high-
rank status position in the long-standing local textile hierarchy and are among the 
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most valued textiles in West Africa; see Sylvanus 2007). Another version claimed that 
she had attempted to negotiate a more profitable deal with a competing Chinese 
drug smuggling network. A third version added another element to the story: the 
trader had been bribing a key customs officer to facilitate her contraband activities. 
She recently had started missing payments, and the murder was a signal to the officer 
that he dare not reveal her illegal Sino-Togolese activities to the police. While only a 
few market women actually knew the victim, her sudden success in the trade of 
textiles had rendered many entrepreneurs suspicious about the real nature of her 
trade engagement. 
 
The story offers a vivid snapshot of the tensions and shifting power relations that 
affect the market, topics that I wish to explore in this article by analyzing the recent 
shifts in the trade of globally produced “African” fabrics.  As the rumors around the 
mysterious murder reveal, crime, conspiracy, corruption, and cupidity constitute 
the key components of the stories and rumors that define the relations among 
the different actors involved. Chinese businessmen appear as immoral, dangerous 
killers and drug smugglers, while the newly enriched trader in this story is 
represented as greedy, manipulative, and dishonest in her relations with both her 
business partner and the state, as symbolized by the customs officer with whom 
she collaborated. In this complicated morality tale, the illicit nature of their trade 
relationship with the Chinese appears central, part of the broader issue of 
illegitimate wealth production in which Chinese and Togolese traders appear as a 
conspiring entity—thus reflecting how morality intersects with new economic forms. 
Moreover, the fabric itself— the materiality of the Chinese copy—is considered 
suspicious because it destabilizes the role the European wax print (the superior 
original) had long performed in Togolese society. This article is thus concerned 
with these recent shifts to a new trade regime in which China holds central 
power. 
 
China in Africa/Togo 
The narratives of “fake” Chinese fabrics, tricksters, and traders offer a privileged lens 
through which to examine how Togolese interpret and assess current political 
transformations and changes in trade hierarchies. While rumors and scapegoating 
practices are intrinsic to economic transactions in general, the violent discourses 
revolving around the figure of the Chinese trickster (and his local associates) are 
interesting to explore with regard to their moral content. This is all the more true as 
the emerging subfield of China–Africa relations has focused on what is termed the 
“New Scramble for Africa,” particularly on resource extraction, the politics of energy, 
trade, investment, and aid (see Alden et al. 2008; Large 2008; Taylor 2006). As 
Western governments, international organizations, and NGOs ponder the ways to 
“engage” China over Africa, as documented by cascading media reports, academic 
literature has focused on similar large-scale economic phenomena (see Broadman 
& Isik 2006). Macrolevel analysis, however, tends to overlook the more intimate 
encounters—real or imagined—between “China” and “Africa.” Numerous edited 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
3 
 
volumes and monographs tend to represent this trade as an invasion of a foreign 
economic structure into the passive body of Africa. From a postcolonial 
perspective, representations of “China’s Africa Scramble” are troublesome, namely 
because they tend to silence local agency and overlook the dialectical process of 
collaboration and adaptation, which, in the case of the reorganization of the 
Togolese textile market, I found operative at many different levels. My intent here 
is not to offer an analysis of “resistance,” as people are never just reacting. Rather, 
the article situates Togolese women traders (and, by extension, consumers) as 
producers and as central historical and economic subjects in the making of a 
postcolonial commodity chain for printed African textiles. 
 
In The Dragon’s Gift, Deborah Bräutigam captures an important aspect of the “China 
in Africa” trope by reminding us that the “Chinese are many things in Africa: 
touring presidents delivering grand promises for partnership, provincial companies 
with very long names[,]… factory managers demanding long hours of work, tough 
businesswomen, scrap metal buyers, traders” (2010:310). In this article, I examine 
how Togolese subjects have experienced, engaged, and interpreted the “many 
things” the Chinese were in Togo during a period of eight years (2002–10). By 
examining the shifting representations of Chinese agents (textile manufacturers, 
wholesalers, traders) and their operations, the article challenges stereotypical 
notions about the assumed cunning of the Chinese, the inevitability of their advance 
in West African markets, and the assumed vulnerability of African societies. In so 
doing, it also complicates standard economic theories of global market forces. 
 
The data for this paper were drawn from ethnographic research and interviews 
conducted in Lomé between 2002 and 2004, in March–April 2008, and in 
December 2010. I conducted sixty interviews with women between the ages of 
eighteen and sixty-five working in the market as wholesalers, retailers, and 
employees. Most of these women came from families of traders and had mothers 
who had worked in the market as retailers or wholesalers of cloth or other 
commodities. I also conducted thirty interviews with consumers, mostly women but 
also men, who worked in government jobs, the private sector, or in Togo’s booming 
informal economies. In addition, I conducted ten interviews with Chinese agents 
involved in the market in various capacities—as manufacturers, managers, and 
wholesalers—as well as their Togolese employees (drivers and interpreters). In the 
interviews participants discussed the life trajectories that had led them to their 
current positions, their family lives, and their aspirations for the future. In addition 
to conducting the interviews, I spent time with the participants in the marketplace 
and in their homes and was able to establish close personal relationships with several 
of them.1 
 
The article begins with a brief historical overview of the Lomé market and its key 
actors, from its early postcolonial politics to more recent political transformations 
and their impact on the market. It then focuses on the reorganization of the market 
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to discuss how long-held hierarchies and modalities of trade have shifted by 
exploring the trajectory of one trader, her travels to China, and her short-lived 
power monopoly in the Lomé market. A final section discusses how traders and 
consumers talk and think about “les Chinois” (and Chinese goods) and how one 
Chinese manufacturer views this relationship. I conclude by suggesting that 
notions of deviant “Chineseness” continue to be produced in Togo not simply as a 
reflection of the well-established presence of Chinese traders or goods, but rather 
as a way of talking about the neoliberal market, its new temporalities and modalities 
of competition. The Chinese devil, I argue, stands in for the global market itself and 
its double bind of inclusion and exclusion, which Togolese have experienced as a 
contradictory process: a development implying both possibility and impossibility, the 
fulfillment of aspirations and displacement. 
 
Market Politics 
Until the 1990s, Lomé’s textile market was firmly controlled by a group of women 
traders, famously known throughout West Africa under the name “Nana-Benz.” 
These traders had negotiated exclusive retail rights with colonial firms such as 
Unilever’s United Africa Company and took on the regional distribution for 
European goods, including the trade in wax prints. These vibrant, multicolored 
patterned fabrics—a staple in women’s clothing practices in large parts of West 
Africa—were introduced to West Africa at the end of the nineteenth century as a 
result of a broader imperial history that linked the sites of European industrial 
capitalism to Java and subsequently West Africa’s Gold Coast. The origin of the wax 
print is linked to European, especially Dutch, attempts to mechanically reproduce 
Javanese batik cloth for the markets of the Dutch East Indies, and their 
subsequent relocation and reorientation to the West African market. By the end of 
the nineteenth century, Dutch and other European textile manufacturers had 
adapted the earlier approximations of Indonesian batiks to the taste and aesthetic 
preferences of West African consumers in an interactive process. Thus, a hybrid 
product at the outset, the Dutch wax print became a distinctly African consumable, 
despite its place of production. From the 1950s onward, Togo’s Nana-Benzes played a 
key role in the shaping of this market and in the making of the fabric as a West 
African consumable par excellence.2 
 
By the mid-1970s, the trade in textiles exceeded Togo’s phosphate industry, which 
had long been the country’s primary source of revenue. Meanwhile, the Nana-
Benzes consolidated their economic power through the creation of an oligopolistic 
market association that strengthened their trading interests and was a de facto 
representative of the dictator, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, himself. Eyadéma provided the 
Nana-Benzes with import licenses, low turnover taxes, and the region’s lowest 
reexportation taxes during a period when most of Togo’s neighbors faced political 
instability. In return, the Nana-Benzes expressed public support for Eyadéma and 
became involved in the women’s wing of the ruling Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais 
(RPT). During the 1980s, however, the relationship between the political sphere and 
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Lomé’s trading elite began to change. The authority of the Eyadéma regime was 
weakened with economic liberalizations, the withdrawal of imperial resources in 
the aftermath of the Cold War, as well as the liberalization of Togo’s public sphere 
during a time of political liberalization and the embrace of la démocratie (see Piot 
1999, 2010). In 1991–92 Eyadéma was temporarily expelled from power, and a 
number of second-generation textile traders sided with the opposition.3 During the 
time of the transitional government, members of Eyadéma’s RPT vandalized and 
looted the traders’ shops. In 1992, street protests and large-scale strikes in southern 
Togolese cities paralyzed the country’s economy for almost eighteen months, and most 
of the textile traders, also fearing repression, left the country for Benin. 
 
Eyadéma fraudulently returned to power in 1993, and two years of intense 
political tension followed. When Togo’s trading elite, unable to prosper in Benin’s 
protected economy, returned to Lomé in 1994, they found an economic 
environment that had changed profoundly, not only at the local level, but also at the 
regional and international levels.4 Togo’s Nana-Benzes found themselves in a 
profoundly restructured trade setting: Unilever’s United Africa Company, the chief 
distributor of wax prints in West Africa, had sold its trading houses to the Dutch 
wax-print manufacturer Vlisco. When Vlisco took over Unilever’s West African 
distribution units, it broke with Unilever’s policies, including those 
arrangements the Nana-Benzes had negotiated during the late colonial period. With 
the demise of Togo’s reputation of political and economic stability, and Cotonou’s rise as 
a new trade hub for textiles, Lomé’s trading elite thus entered a phase of 
reconfiguration that would permanently change the order of trade in Togo.5 The 
devaluation of the regional currency, the CFA franc, was another setback for Lomé’s 
Nana-Benzes. 
 
With the changes in the state apparatus, the regime not only retreated from its 
regulatory functions to take on a politics of survival, but it also retreated from its 
long-held role as patron over the economy. Eyadéma adopted a policy of economic 
laissez-faire and focused on his political succession rather than on governing. In 
2003 he appointed one of his sons, Faure Gnassingbé, to a key ministerial 
position and made another son, Kpatcha Gnassingbé, the administrative head of 
the Lomé free port. In marketing the port and its neighboring free trade zone as a 
“flexible” host to the worlds’ “global shadows” (Ferguson 2006), the regime made 
the entrepôt-port attractive to various “informal” networks, in particular Chinese 
traders. 
 
When Eyadéma died in 2005, whatever political and economic regulations had 
persisted during his regime were essentially suspended. The controversial 
installment of the young Faure Gnassingbé by the military and his subsequent 
“official” election were marked by uncertainty. Power struggles and rivalries among 
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Eyadéma’s sons accentuated the diffusion of power, which has persisted despite 
Faure’s reelection in 2010. 
 
Chinese Encounters 
The future of Togo, as conceived by the reelected president, will be a future 
marked by le changement (change) and a looking to the Far East instead of the 
West. The newly designed Web site of the Togolese Republic, which is part of a $25-
million Chinese-financed “e-government” project to be implemented by the 
Chinese telecom giant Huawei, is particularly revealing. The entries there 
promoting Chinese corporations read like an announcement of the future—a 
future in which China will hold central importance. One announcement, for example, 
suggests that Chinese Great Wall cars, which recently were exhibited at Lomé’s 
trade fair, will soon be replacing Peugeots and Renaults on the streets of Lomé. 
 
But perhaps of the most immediate and obvious result of the Chinese influx has been 
felt among Togo’s textile traders, formerly the backbone of the economy. The 
profitable trade in Dutch prints, once the monopoly of Togo’s Nana-Benzes, has 
gradually lost its privileged economic status. Economic power is now in the hands 
of new women traders engaged in the import of cheap Chinese copies of the Dutch 
designs. A second-generation Nana-Benz, who had inherited her mother’s trade 
empire in the 1980s, expressed her suspicions about the sudden wealth of these 
women. 
 
These girls go to China only once or twice. They know nothing about textiles or the 
mechanism of the market, they don’t come from trade families, nobody has ever 
seen them inside the Grand-Marché. And yet immediately after they return from 
Shanghai they construct fancy villas and purchase BMWs.… The money can’t possibly 
come from the sales of Chinese textiles. 
 
While her mistrust in the legality of the activities of her younger competitors indicates 
a mix of envy and anxious condemnation, it also indicates the shift taking place in 
the order of trade—from protected, monopolized markets to free markets. Her 
comment, which was echoed in the many stories and anecdotes I gathered in the 
market, reflected the elite’s anxiety about its displacement by an emergent 
entrepreneurial nouveau riche that navigates the neoliberal market with savvy and 
enterprising flexibility. These younger women traders are referred to in the market as 
les Nanettes— contemporary, albeit smaller, versions of the “Nana-Benz.” The 
murdered trader discussed in the opening section was just such a Nanette, standing 
in for a new order of trade in which moral standards are lax and greed, illicit 
trafficking, and collaboration with the state are the road to prosperity. 
 
Anthropologists such as Comaroff and Comaroff (1993) have written about the ways 
in which figures of success and prosperity, along with culturally encoded 
associations between money and magic, indicate the contradictions brought on by 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
7 
 
“modernity and its malcontents.” Togo’s Nana-Benzes were long accused of being 
linked to the Mami Wata divinity— the water spirit that generates entrepreneurial 
success. But the success of the younger Nanettes is even more mysterious, and 
increasingly associated with new tricksters of the global market that have yet to be 
identified. While there have been no explicit witchcraft accusations against the 
Nanettes, speculation and rumors about the relationship between Chinese and newer 
traders are tinged with suspicion: Where does the money come from? How is it 
possible to accumulate such wealth in a decaying economy? 
 
In 2003 I conducted a series of interviews with Antoinette Mensah, an 
entrepreneur famous for her role in the monopolization of the trade in damask 
fabric (see Sylvanus 2008). She was not a Nana-Benz (like many others, she had been 
unable to enter this highly controlled market), but she had become a prominent 
figure in the late 1970s when she controlled the import of damask (bazin) fabrics from 
Switzerland, Austria, and Germany. She also is part of the first generation of traders 
to explore Asian trade connections, and she was the first Togolese entrepreneur to 
visit mainland China (in early 2000).6 
 
African traders have been interested in trading with China since the 1970s, but 
Mensah’s first experiences with the Chinese were in 1995. She had brought a set of 
samples, mostly non–wax prints, to Bangkok, and she wished to reproduce them as 
economically as possible. She met a Thai entrepreneur who introduced her to a 
colleague in Hong Kong who was the head of several textile manufacturing units. 
She worked with this Chinese manufacturer in Hong Kong for several weeks, and 
recalls his many misconceptions about African tastes. She had to point out 
repeatedly, for example, that her concern for her profit margin did not mean that 
she would accept goods that were shoddy or cheap. 
 
The finishing of their fabrics was dumpy.… It was glossy and cheap looking. They didn’t 
understand that Africans like the finishing being matte.… The fabrics were stiff and they 
had a taste of salt. I had to teach them everything and together we made samples over 
and over again until c’était bon. At the beginning they just couldn’t understand that 
Africans really care for quality,…that quality is as important as the design of the 
fabric. 
 
After weeks of “hard work,” Mensah judged the results good enough for a trial run. 
She named the fabrics after her daughter, Sasa, and the “Super-Sasa” fabrics met 
with immediate success on the market, mostly because of their attractive price 
point in a postdevaluation period that had reduced the competitiveness of 
European products on African markets (see Bayart 2000:238).7 Mensah’s business 
flourished as wholesalers throughout the region came to Lomé to purchase the 
fabrics; indeed, when she fully realized the potential of her Super-Sasa prints she 
repackaged the twelve-yard units she had sold for 12,000 francs CFA and turned 
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them into six-yard units for the same price.8 Her sudden success, however, had its 
negative side. The indications and symbols of her newly acquired wealth— her 
daughter’s Mercedes, her new house, her well-situated shop and fancy delivery van—
gave rise to speculation, rumors, and criticism. She was said to be engaged in a 
conspiracy with her Chinese business partners and simply working as a figurehead 
for them. She was accused of cheating the population with this selling of “fake” 
fabrics. Then, in 1996, she was confronted with a more material challenge: a group 
of Togolese traders had her prints reproduced in India and copies of Super-Sasa 
fabrics entered the market. This was the beginning of an endless process of 
imitation and competition. 
 
Despite this new twist, Antoinette Mensah remained in the game, refusing to be 
discouraged either by her local competitors or by the difficulties of dealing with 
the Chinese, who, as she put it, “really can’t be trusted and…don’t like Africans.” Now, 
in fact, she represents a model of economic shrewdness to many of her colleagues 
from Lomé’s Grand-Marché, who see the value of flexibility in one’s trading 
ventures and admire the ability to switch from one market segment to another 
and adapt to ever-changing economic opportunities. Mensah herself became the 
first Togolese trader to explore China’s Shandong region and soon established a 
partnership with a Shanghai-based company interested in reproducing European 
wax prints. In 2001 her new fabric, the “Mondial wax,” arrived in Lomé, the first 
Chinese wax print to enter the market. It soon became a key product in Togo, 
Ghana, Benin, and Nigeria, where it was sold for a tenth of the price of the original 
Dutch Vlisco fabric and generated unprecedented profits.9 Those in charge of 
distributing real Dutch Vlisco fabric, whom she had partially driven out of business, 
denounced her as a ruthless, cheating trader. But Mensah argues she has brought 
about a form of “consumption democratization” to Togo; “finally everybody can 
dress in wax: China wax is beautiful!” 
 
Antoinette Mensah’s exclusive control over the wax-print fabric was not 
permanent—she soon lost her monopoly when her Shanghai-based manufacturer 
expanded its customer network. While selling containers of the same product at 
different prices throughout the region, the Chinese manufacturer severely 
deregulated the local and regional market and engendered increased 
competition. Soon several competing Shanghai-based firms also entered the 
market, thus intensifying the deregulation. Mensah did not foresee this change, 
and this development was clearly out of her hands. Nevertheless, her colleagues 
in the market hold her partly responsible for having brought the free market to 
Togo, and she claims today that she wishes she had never started trading with these 
“Chinese devils.” However, in contrast to common perceptions that attribute market 
transformation to the “invasion” of Chinese low-cost commodities, and to the collusion 
today of some of the so-called Nanettes, her story reveals a much more complicated 
trajectory—one that challenges the standard political-economy perspective that 
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portrays women traders (when they are part of the analysis) as either being overrun 
by global structural forces and neoliberalism, colluding with those forces, or 
heroically resisting them. Her story, by contrast, provides a more nuanced 
representation of “China’s Africa Scramble”—showing the inaccuracies in the usual 
dichotomous narrative and the ways in which the Africa–China relationship has been 
coproduced. 
 
Representations and Chinese Manufactures 
As elsewhere in West Africa, Togolese consumers have come to accept the presence of 
China and Chinese goods with a great deal of ambivalence— although, of course, such 
discourses have a long history in West Africa, particularly in situations of privation 
and change (see White 2000). I am not interested in the truth of stories such as 
the murder tale recounted above, but rather in what these narratives reveal about the 
way people have interpreted and experienced global changes and shifts in the 
market. For example, consider the symbolic interpretations regarding the fabric 
at the center of the story. The Chinese-made fabric, which had caused the trader’s 
success and ultimate death, was a knock-off of the superior Dutch original. In the 
stories regarding the murder, the cloth itself was invested with deceitful and illicit 
meanings. By 2004 people were clearly aware of the origins of the fabric they were 
purchasing, but their comments about the trader still reflected lingering anxieties 
about being tricked out of their agency as consumers. “If I had a choice, I wouldn’t 
buy these cheap copies that these Chinese devils produce,” one of my informants 
had said in 2002. “If I had the money, I would never wear these nasty fabrics. I would 
buy Dutch, and only the authentic prints. The Chinese stuff, you wear it a couple of 
times, you wash it and there’s nothing left, you have to replace it.” This woman was a 
notary by profession and she explained that her financial situation obliged her to buy 
Chinese knock-offs: her children were studying in Canada and the U.S. and she 
cannot afford Vlisco fabrics. But her peers would consider her as no longer being “up 
to date” if she continued to wear the same Vlisco outfit to all social events. 
 
I repeatedly came across the perception that the Chinese, contrary to the claims 
of the Togolese state, did not come to Africa for the sake of mutual development, 
attracted by the absence of conditionalities to Beijing’s assistance, but rather to 
advance themselves and confine Africans in poverty. While several Togolese I spoke 
to in the early 2000s viewed China’s involvement as a positive development (“at 
least they haven’t abandoned us like the West,” stated a bank employee), many 
expressed concern about the real nature of their engagement. “They don’t work with 
us, they bring in their Chinese prisoners to do the construction,” said a zemidjan 
(moto-taxi) driver in 2002. “They’re building the new presidential palace so that they 
have a free hand,” explained a soft-drink vendor in the market. In the summer of 
2004 a fabric trader in the market explained with annoyance, “Chinese only imitate, 
they don’t develop products for us, they don’t care, they just want their factories to 
continue producing, they can’t consume all these products, so we are getting 
their junk.” Another trader, similarly infuriated, said “they don’t adapt to us, they 
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do all their business in Chinese.… They speak no French or English … and they 
don’t like to mix with locals, they only keep to themselves.… They don’t even give 
you receipts and you have to pay in cash!” Still others, as echoed in the murder 
story, suspect that drug smuggling is part of the Chinese operations. Such 
accounts present Chinese traders and business modalities as defined primarily by 
“lack”: a lack of accountability, a lack of morality and transparency, and more 
generally, a lack of humanity.10 
 
I repeatedly encountered views regarding the perceived “otherness” and 
inhumanness of les Chinois. While most people I spoke to between 2002 and 
2004 had indeed consumed Chinese goods, few of my interviewees (with the 
exception of the wholesale traders in the market) had in fact interacted with les Chinois 
on a face-to-face basis; instead, many accounts of spectacular Chinese “otherness” 
appeared to rely on rumors and stories retold by  friends of  friends. Such  stories 
ranged  from  Chinese culinary practices—they were said to preserve snakes and 
monkeys in jars, which Togolese considered to be a sign of their “savageness”—to 
vicious trade practices: “They show you fabric samples, they give you a price, and then 
they go next door and they sell the same sample at a lower price. They make a mess and 
destroy our business.”11 
 
In 2010, stereotypical representations of “Chinese-ness” continued to circulate in 
Togo, and caricatures of le Chinois—not unlike West African jokes of the colonial 
period about le Blanc or le Colon, the white colonizer— appeared in popular jokes and 
cartoons, reflecting the established presence of a Chinese community in the popular 
culture. The increased visibility of China on the streets of Lomé (from karaoke bars, 
restaurants, fast-food street-vending operations, and massage studios to Chinese 
construction workers and supervisors) and the everyday encounters with “China” (be 
it via traders, shop owners, goods, or media representations) signaled a shift in 
perception. Togolese realized that the Chinese presence was not a transitory 
phenomenon—that the Chinese had come to stay and inevitably were part of their 
futures, as reflected in the state’s active courting of China. Most Togolese had 
indeed became active consumers of Chinese goods, knock-offs of old-world 
commodities, and although many had stories to tell about the poor quality—of 
Chinese matches breaking, of low-performing cell-phone batteries, of skin-irritating 
soaps and flawed air conditioners— other observers acknowledged some value. As one 
of my interviewees amusingly stated in reference to the increasingly segmented 
market of Chinese goods available in Lomé, “there are different degrees of Chinois.” 
 
An illustrative case is provided by the Chinese textile manufacturing firm of Auden. 
As a regional manager of the company explained, by 2008 several Chinese textile 
manufacturers had changed their production and marketing strategies. While during 
the early 2000s Chinese manufacturers were eager to establish local networks to 
expand their clientele, they eventually limited these networks. While Auden had a rocky 
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start, initially struggling to finding what my interlocutor called “reliable clients,” he 
explained that “we don’t want any more clients, we have too many clients already,… 
our factories can hardly keep up with the ever-increasing demand.” This 
development contrasted with contentions about China’s presumably insatiable hunger 
to expand its market share, or with newspaper headlines of Chinese textile dumping. 
 
At the same time, Auden’s place in the Togolese market was by no means secure 
or guaranteed. The strategic shift in Chinese wax cloth manufacturing has 
involved not only changes in distribution but also in the segmentation of the wax-
print market. Today, several Chinese factories produce and compete in the superior 
quality market, and although this product is inferior to the Dutch “original,” it has 
come to occupy a real market niche. As elsewhere in West Africa, Togolese consumers 
increasingly 
 
value  this  high-end  segment,  and  several  Chinese  labels—especially Hitarget or 
Phoenix—have become desirable commodities for which consumers are willing to pay 
up to 13,000 francs CFA (compared to 45,000 for the original Vlisco). These new 
labels attract consumers who previously bought the Nigerian-produced Nichemtex 
or the Ghanian-produced ATL (both owned by the Hong Kong–based group Cha 
Chi Ming) as well as the Ivorian- and Ghanaian-produced labels Uniwax and GTP 
(which are owned by Vlisco).12 In 2008, when discussing intra-Chinese 
competition with another interlocutor from the Auden firm, I learned of the firm’s 
fear of industrial espionage—a concern that was a strange reminder of the practices of 
the European textile manufacturers who began producing prints for the West 
African market during the early twentieth century. Competition was fierce, and one 
manager even received instructions from Shanghai not to mix with other Chinese. In 
the case of Auden, such measures appear to have been in vain. In December 2010 I 
drove to its former Togolese office— a large villa located in a residential 
neighborhood not far from the Lomé free port where the Chinese employees also 
lived—only to find that the company had abandoned its operation. Moreover, while 
Auden wax prints had known considerable success during my previous visits, the 
fabrics had virtually disappeared from the market. A wholesale trader explained 
that the firm’s quality had declined so significantly that she chose to sell other 
Chinese labels, namely Hitarget. The example of a manufacturer such as Auden, 
whose products were initially successful but were subsequently abandoned, is 
significant to note, and stories such as this one tend to be overlooked in the 
literature on “China’s Africa Scramble.” At least in the context of Chinese 
manufacturing of African prints, it is safe to suggest that intra-Chinese competition 
constitutes an important node of the story. 
 
Conclusion 
In 2004, few Lomeans had actually encountered Chinese traders, but Lomé’s 
rumor mill was flush with stories about them and those who collaborated with them. 
Representations of “the Chinese” were relatively vague and often rather spectacular, 
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not only in the rumors about the real story behind the murder but also, for 
example, in stories such the one about monkeys allegedly being preserved in jars. 
But these stories nevertheless indicated that les Chinois had come to occupy a place 
in local cosmologies. By 2006, only two years following the circulation of the 
vicious rumor, China’s presence in Lomé had become real and visible to most of the 
city’s inhabitants, in ways that included, in fact, Togo’s first anti-Chinese protest 
march in the market.13 
 
As elsewhere in Africa, not only did Togolese consumers encounter Chinese 
retailers in the market, but more significantly, Chinese goods had become a staple 
to nearly all. What initially may have been perceived as a possibility—Togo’s 
dependence on China as chief provider of consumer goods and, by extension, 
Togo’s disconnection from the Global North—rapidly  became  an  economic  reality.  In  
2010  a  cartoon  that appeared in the popular Lomé magazine Sika’a particularly amused 
some of my trading friends in the market.14 The sketch showcased an encounter between a 
woman trader, sitting in front of a market stall, and a Chinese salesman carrying an 
overflowing suitcase of Yuan bills leaving his own stall selling “development from below” 
(dévélopment à la base). The woman interpellates the Chinese with a colloquial, “Chinois, 
j’ai du bon manioc, il faut acheter” (Chinese, I have good cassava, you must buy), while the 
Chinois responds “Ah oui, oh yes, it must surely be very good” (my translation). What 
made my friends in the market laugh was not merely the fact that the man’s response 
included several mispronunciations of the French (in stereotypical fashion the cartoonist 
had replaced the letter “s ” with the letter “l ” in several words, which made for a stuttering-
like effect),15 but rather the fact that le Chinois in fact had no real power. When I asked 
them to specify, they explained that the Chinese, after all, are not “as savvy as people say 
they are.” My interlocutors, two Nanettes who themselves had traveled to China many 
times and who imported large quantities of Hitarget fabrics, insisted that what the sketch 
captured so accurately was the fact that the Chinese “really are not their own agents” but are 
“simply executors” of another’s project: that is, of Chinese capitalism itself, as symbolized in 
the overflowing suitcase of currency carried by an agent who not only does not master the 
language, but who also has no clue about cassava or other local specificities. By unveiling 
and mocking the weakness of the Chinese in the Lomé market, the cartoon (and the 
Nanettes’ comments) were pointing to a dimension to the China-in-Africa story that often is 
overlooked in the literature—that is, China’s relative vulnerability in West African markets. 
Of course, as one of my informants said, “there are different degrees of Chinois,” and the 
Chinese, as we have seen are never just “one thing,” in Togo as in other parts of Africa. 
And that is the point. If the cartoon mocks Chinese incompetence, the Lomé market case, as 
this article argues, puts into perspective the myth of a Chinese assault on West African 
markets and, by extension, the assumed vulnerability of African societies. 
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Notes 
1. Reconstructions of events and quotations are all based on the collected data. To 
protect my interviewees’ privacy, I have chosen to conceal their identities. The 
opening anecdote and some of the ethnographic evidence appeared previously in an 
article published in Politique Africaine (Sylvanus 2009). Thanks to the editors of 
Politique Africaine for permission to reprint this material. 
2. Wax prints soon became associated with sartorial elegance which affluent 
consumers used as a signifier of elite status to mark social hierarchy in a rapidly 
changing society. 
3. See Heilbrunn (1993); Kwajaku (1994); Ellis (1994); Mace (2004). A few elderly 
women traders remained neutral during this period, but most market women played 
central roles in the newly founded political parties. 
4. Eyadéma incited the economic elite to return to Togo notably by playing the 
card of xenophobia in a series of broadcasts that mobilized the figure of the foreign 
trader as taking over the economy. 
5. Benin not only became a model of successful democratic transition, but the 
port city also benefitted from the Togolese crisis and took over its regional trade 
during this period of political and economic transition. 
6. The following account of her activities is based on interviews and conversations with 
her as well as one of her employees. 
7. “Sasa” and “Super-Sasa” are not the real names. 
8. 1,000 francs CFA is equal to approximately US$2.00 
9. Vlisco copies, notably from India and Pakistan, had existed in the market 
before, but Mondial wax was the first copy using the actual Dutch technique. 
10. It is ironic to note here that the language of “lack” is usually employed to 
describe the disorder and inefficiency of postcolonial African cities in development 
discourse (see Ferguson 2006). 
11. This was spoken by a young wholesale trader who had inherited her mother’s 
business and today struggles to diversify her business. But adding Chinese fabrics 
to her repertoire has largely proved to be a failure. 
12. In the case of Cha Chi Ming (or CHA), it is useful to note that the group has 
operated in West Africa since the 1960s. What is equally worth noting is that the 
Auden manager I spoke to had built his entire career in Ghana as a textile engineer 
with CHA until he was hired away by the Shanghai-based Auden in 2004. West 
African postindependence textile markets had indeed attracted a number of “Asian” 
investors. As postcolonial African states established national textile industries as the 
backbone of their economies—thus promoting “authentic” African dress styles and 
prints—the Hong Kong industrialist, textile engineer, and entrepreneur Cha Chi 
Ming extended his textile enterprise to West Africa (Nigeria) in 1964. During the 
1960s and 1970s CHA deployed several hundred Hong Kong Chinese workers, textile 
engineers, and designers to Nigeria and Ghana. To this day CHA owns several 
factories and brands, which are distributed throughout West Africa. In the 1990s, 
the group CHA bought the historic Manchester textile mill ABC (Vlisco’s historic 
competitor) where wax prints had been produced for West African markets since 
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1908. In 2008 production ceased in Manchester and ABC machinery was transferred 
to Ghana, where CHA continues to produce its brands ATL and ABC. 
13. In December 2006 an anti-Chinese demonstration was organized by a group of 
women traders. Unlike wholesalers, who travel to China and place their orders 
directly at the site of production, small-scale traders had become dependent on a 
series of new intermediaries, not only Chinese, but also Sahelien, Indian, and even 
Iranian agents. Several cases of agents delivering unsatisfactory merchandise—or, 
in rare cases, of disappearing with the trader’s money altogether—as well as cases 
of Chinese retailers selling at prices no Togolese small-scale trader could compete 
with, resulted in the women’s protest march. Giving visible expression to what local 
traders perceived as discriminatory trading, the movement called for political 
regulation of the problem. A legal decree in support of their position has essentially 
been unenforced in practice. 
14. Sika’a magazine’s biweekly edition of 7,000 circulates widely throughout the 
Togolese capital at the moderate cost of 250 francs CFA. The caricature described here 
appeared in Sika’a 80 (December 14, 2010). 
15. “Ca doit etle sulement eles bon” reads the Sika’a caricature, instead of “ça doit 
être sûrement très bon.” 
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